Over the last several years Beijing has accelerated a multi-vector approach to contesting space. That approach pairs: (1) sophisticated on-orbit manoeuvre and servicing technologies that can be repurposed for co-orbital counterspace roles; (2) a steady investment in non-kinetic tools such as radiofrequency jammers, spoofers, and directed-energy systems; and (3) advances in strategic strike concepts that blur the boundary between space access and weapons delivery. The net result is not a single silver-bullet capability but an operational ecosystem that raises the cost of assured space access for potential adversaries.

On-orbit manoeuvre and the rise of dual-use OSAM tooling

China has demonstrated sustained rendezvous and proximity operations at multiple orbital regimes, and the Shijian-21 (SJ-21) episode in GEO remains the clearest public illustration of how on-orbit servicing technologies can be used for either debris mitigation or counterspace effects. Commercial space situational-awareness providers tracked SJ-21 performing a close approach, docking with a defunct BeiDou navigation satellite, and then escorting or towing that object out of the crowded GEO belt into a higher graveyard orbit — movements consistent with an on-orbit servicing or space-tug profile, and in one public analysis described as a roughly 3,000 kilometer reboost above GEO. The mechanics observed — precision RPO, grappling or capture, and large delta-v burns — are the exact technical building blocks you would need to convert a servicing platform into a co-orbital manipulator. That duality is the threat vector.

Kinetic legacy and the persistent debris problem

Kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) testing remains the clearest historical precedent for why counterspace kinetic attacks are globally destabilizing. China’s 2007 direct-ascent ASAT intercept of the Fengyun-1C weather satellite created the single largest catalogued debris field in history and left thousands of trackable fragments that continue to raise collision risk in heavily used LEO regimes. The long tail of that event still informs planners: debris endures, multiplies collision probability for all operators, and constrains any actor that contemplates repeated debris-generating tests. In practice, that means most near-term counterspace competition has shifted toward non-kinetic and reversible tools precisely to avoid repeat debris catastrophes, but the kinetic option still exists and remains an organizing concern for international space safety.

Non-kinetic tools: jamming, spoofing, cyber, and lasers

Open-source defense assessments show Beijing investing heavily in non-kinetic counterspace capabilities. Electronic attack against space links is already operationalized in the form of jamming and spoofing aimed at PNT and SATCOM channels. Separately, the U.S. defense community has publicly assessed that China fields multiple ground-based laser systems and is developing higher-power directed-energy systems and high-power microwave concepts that could be employed to dazzle, degrade, or — at higher power levels in the mid-to-late 2020s timeframe — physically damage non-optical satellite components. These capabilities are coupled with offensive cyber options against ground segments and space-enabled networks. The operational logic is clear: non-kinetic effects can be finely tailored, are deniable or hard to attribute in real time, and avoid the long-term orbital pollution that kinetic strikes generate.

Hypersonics, FOBS-like tests, and strategic ambiguity

A separate but related set of concerns derives from tests reported in 2021 in which Chinese boosters lofted objects on trajectories that later drew comparisons to fractional orbital bombardment system concepts. Public reporting and U.S. analyses described a test profile in which a hypersonic glide vehicle was lofted into a partial orbital trajectory and then re-entered to impact a target area. Whether labeled hypersonic, FOBS-like, or a reusable space vehicle test, the practical implication for deterrence and early warning is an added layer of strategic ambiguity. Such tests do not directly equate to weaponized permanent orbital deployments, but they do signal Beijing’s interest in delivery modes that complicate legacy early-warning and missile-defense chains of operation.

Organizational and programmatic context: force structure and launch cadence

China has been enlarging both its on-orbit footprint and launch tempo. PLA-organizational changes announced in 2024 re-aligned space, cyber, and information functions under new service-level constructs that centralize aerospace and information support operations. That reorganization, coupled with state-backed satellite constellation programs and a sustained high launch cadence, materially improves Beijing’s options for resilience, replenishment, and distributed sensing. In short, China is buying not just individual counterspace tools but logistical and structural depth that make those tools operationally meaningful during a crisis.

Operational implications and likely employment patterns

  • Escalation control through reversible effects. Expect a preference for reversible, non-debris-generating attacks early in a crisis: RF jamming, GNSS spoofing, optical sensor dazzling, and cyber intrusions aimed at ground segments. These techniques yield tactical advantages while preserving plausible deniability and limiting long-term orbital harm.

  • Layered counterspace campaigns. Beijing will be able to combine persistent ISR from proliferated constellations with ground-based nonlinear effects and selective on-orbit manoeuvres to shape adversary behavior across multiple timescales. That combination raises the cost of U.S. and allied operations that assume uninterrupted space services for targeting, timing, and communications.

  • Targeting emphasis. High-value C2, long-range targeting sensors, and PNT nodes are the most likely initial objectives because disrupting those systems yields outsized battlefield leverage while minimizing collateral orbital risk.

What to watch next: technical indicators and strategic markers

  • RPO telemetry and anomalous delta-v. Increased frequency of rendezvous, multi-day stationkeeping near foreign assets, or unexplained ejections of sub-satellites are direct technical signals of evolving co-orbital counterspace intent. Commercial SSA feeds have proven indispensable for catching these behaviours in near real time.

  • Directed-energy fielding milestones. Public confirmation of higher-power ground laser fields or operational HPM deployments that can threaten non-optical satellites would represent a material shift in counterspace lethality. Watch procurement notices, state media technical disclosures, and western defense assessments for first-order indicators.

  • Constellation scale and resilience architecture. Massive LEO constellations with crosslinks, autonomous collision avoidance, and rapid launch replenishment change the calculus of denial. If Beijing closes capability gaps in resilient PNT, optical/IR ISR, and mesh SATCOM fast enough, it will be able to accept higher attrition rates during contested operations.

Policy implications and practical recommendations for U.S. and allied planners

1) Harden and diversify: Accelerate deployment of resilient PNT alternatives, proliferated cross-linked ISR, optical intersatellite links, and hardened ground nodes. Do not rely on single-point satellite services for high-consequence functions.

2) Invest in transparency-capable SSA: Expand commercial and allied SSA partnerships and fund systems that deliver low-latency, attribution-grade data. Commercial SSA was central to revealing several recent Chinese RPOs and will continue to be essential for timely diplomacy and operational decision-making.

3) Promote norms while preparing for denial: Continue diplomatic pushes for responsible behaviour in space — including formal restraint on debris-producing kinetic tests — while simultaneously preparing operational options that accept non-kinetic competition as a likely reality. Avoid naïveté: norms and arms control are necessary but will not substitute for technical resilience.

Conclusion

Through a combination of OSAM-capable platforms, non-kinetic effects, and strategic experiments that complicate early warning, China has created a layered counterspace toolkit that is operationally credible and politically flexible. The technical sophistication of recent behaviours — from SJ-21’s GEO manoeuvres to the hypersonic/FOBS-like tests and continued laser and jamming development — means the space domain will be contested in nuanced ways during the rest of this decade. Preparing for that reality requires both technology investments that raise the cost of denial and diplomatic work to keep kinetic escalation and debris generation off the table. The problem is not only capability. It is the coupling of new tools with organizational depth, rapid launch capacity, and a political will to exploit ambiguity in crisis. That combination is what will define 2025-era space competition in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.