The United States is at an inflection point in how it treats directed energy as an exportable capability. Over the last three years American services have moved from laboratory demonstrations to operational fielding of high energy lasers and other directed energy systems, and that operational reality is colliding with decades-old export control frameworks designed for kinetic weapons and complex avionics. The kinetic result is a policy tension: allies want interoperable, lower-cost counters to drone and rocket threats, while Washington must guard against proliferation, diversion, and loss of technical advantage.
Regulatory foundations and recent reform attempts
Exports of military lasers and related sensors sit at the intersection of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations on the one hand and the Export Administration Regulations on the other. In practice the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers the ITAR controls for items on the U.S. Munitions List while Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security governs certain dual-use or less sensitive components. From October 2024 onward the executive branch launched a package of rulemaking and proposed changes intended to modernize how the USML and CCL treat space and related high-tech items, but these reforms did not remove directed-energy weapons from rigorous licensing and congressional notification processes. That means many laser-related exports still require case-by-case review and, for significant transactions, congressional report and notification.
What Washington is already licensing
Public Federal Register notifications in late 2024 show concrete examples of U.S. approvals or proposed approvals touching laser technologies that are not the headline “laser gun” systems. One formal congressional notification described support for the manufacture and repair of laser tracker receivers and components for a target sensor program involving Israel and Romania. Separately the State Department has certified related exports for assembly or sustainment of laser-guided munitions in Europe. These are not necessarily sales of high-energy weapon beams, but they demonstrate a willingness to authorize associated optics, tracking, and guidance hardware where the political and operational calculus supports partner capabilities.
Operational demand and the export market
Operational demand is driving partner interest. The U.S. Army’s Palletized High Energy Laser and a growing portfolio of service-directed-energy systems have been employed overseas for counter-UAS missions, validating operational concepts that partners want replicated in their own forces. The Pentagon’s directed-energy portfolio has reached into the low hundreds of millions per program and the broader DOD investment in directed energy has been publicly characterized in the order of roughly one billion dollars per year with dozens of systems in development or prototype phases. That combination of operational validation and a deepening industrial pipeline is a predictable driver for foreign interest and for export requests.
Enforcement and the limits of licensing
History illustrates both the temptation to move restricted items and the vigilance of enforcement authorities. A 2024 criminal indictment and arrest involving the illegal export of laser welding equipment to a Rosatom-linked entity in Russia shows how commercial-grade lasers and related equipment can have proliferation pathways when end-use controls are evaded. Enforcement will remain a necessary complement to licensing because the technical thresholds between benign industrial lasers and defense-relevant directed-energy capabilities are often porous.
Operational and strategic tradeoffs
Exporting laser capabilities yields concrete benefits: improved allied deterrence, battlefield interoperability, reduced logistics tails if partners can maintain systems locally, and a larger global base for sustainment and upgrades that can lower lifecycle costs. Conversely there are near-term risks: adversary reverse engineering, re-export to third parties, escalation dynamics if lasers are seen as enabling offensive fires, and erosion of asymmetric advantages where the United States relies on a lead in beam control, thermal management, and high-power electrical integration. These tradeoffs are not theoretical. They show up in the specific licensing choices the DDTC makes and in the design of end-use monitoring regimes like the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry programs that the State Department and DoD use to verify post-delivery compliance.
Practical policy choices the U.S. faces
Three pragmatic options are emerging that would balance partner needs, industrial health, and national security:
1) Tiered exports and capability-limited variants. License lower-power, counter-UAS and dazzler variants more readily while reserving microwave-scale or >100 kW class systems and beam directors with long-range coupling for stricter review or in-country co-production. That allows partners operational capability without immediate transfer of the most sensitive integration know-how. Evidence of selective licensing for targeting sensors and sustainment components suggests this path is already being used in principle.
2) Conditional co-production and mark-for-purpose transfers. Where allies have secure supply chains and robust end-use monitoring Washington can permit licensed manufacture or assembly under strict Golden Sentry style assurances, reducing logistics burdens while preserving traceability. The law already contemplates manufacture abroad under AECA certifications, but directed energy will force more granular political and technical conditions.
3) Robust EUM and enforcement budgets. Licensing without credible post-shipment verification is a non-starter. The United States should couple any increase in directed-energy export volume with expanded Blue Lantern pre- and post-shipment checks and with interagency resourcing for export enforcement to deter and punish diversion. The Rosatom-related indictment is a reminder that bad actors will attempt to game paperwork and commercial front companies.
Industry implications
U.S. prime contractors and their supply chains are simultaneously developing exportable variants and lobbying for clearer rules. The industrial case is straightforward: allies will pay a premium for systems that integrate into U.S. architectures and logistics, and foreign production or sustainment agreements increase lifetime sales. But industry also needs predictable licensing timelines and technical definitions that separate controlled beam directors, power management modules, and guidance optics from commodity laser sources used in civilian industry. The recent rulemaking and USML modernization efforts start to provide that clarity, but they have not resolved the hard technical thresholds that determine whether an item is ITAR-covered or EAR-controlled.
A narrow path to responsible exports
If the United States wants an “independence” narrative — allies able to operate and sustain advanced defenses without being hostage to single-supplier chains — then export policy must be redesigned around three principles: technical granularity, enforceable end-use transparency, and interoperable constraints. Technical granularity means defining control parameters in terms of measurable beam power, dwell time, and coupling to effect rather than vague descriptors like “specially designed.” Enforceable end-use transparency means expanding post-shipment monitoring and conditional co-production with audited facilities. Interoperable constraints means crafting export packages that permit sensible capability transfer while embedding firm-use limitations and software/firmware tethering where appropriate.
Conclusion
By mid-2025 directed energy has moved from experiment to theater and that shift changes the calculus on exports. Washington has begun to authorize related sensors and sustainment items while keeping the most sensitive beam and power integration capabilities tightly controlled. That hybrid approach is defensible but fragile. If the U.S. wants to scale exports responsibly it will need clearer technical definitions, more robust end-use monitoring, and political courage to accept co-production and capability-limited exports where they strengthen allied resilience without surrendering decisive technical advantages. The alternative is a patchwork market that either starves partners of useful defenses or accelerates uncontrolled diffusion of the very capabilities the United States wants to keep from strategic competitors.