Unmanned wingman programs moved from concept studies to operational experimentation during the 2020s. By mid 2024 the field split into two clear vectors. One vector pursues relatively low cost, attritable jet drones optimized for mass and contested-environment roles. The other pursues higher-end, reusable remote carriers intended to escort future sixth generation fighters or to operate as networked effectors across a combat cloud. The distinction matters because it drives tradeoffs in cost, survivability, autonomy and rules of engagement.

United States. The U.S. approach emphasized a modular autonomy kernel and rapid prototyping under initiatives such as Skyborg and related Vanguard efforts. The U.S. Air Force and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center seeded multiple industry teams with IDIQ contracts to accelerate autonomy, open mission systems and missionized prototypes intended to validate manned uncrewed teaming concepts and to drive a program of record. That architecture intentionally accepts attritability and software-centric upgrades as a way to scale massed aerial presence in high threat environments.

Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie is the clearest U.S. exemplar of the attritable wingman path. By late 2023 and into 2024 the Valkyrie had been flight tested in collaborative scenarios and was demonstrated in an electronic-attack and cooperative-flight context with crewed fifth generation platforms. The platform is explicitly designed for runway independence, subsonic cruise, modular mission kits and survivable, low cost attritable operations. Those design choices make it a practical prototype for operational experimentation in manned uncrewed teaming.

Australia. Boeing Australia’s Airpower Teaming System, designated MQ-28A Ghost Bat by the RAAF, exemplifies a near-term national approach to collaborative combat aircraft. The MQ-28 program progressed from rapid concept to test flights and formal naming by 2022, and Canberra repeatedly framed the capability as a force multiplier that would fly ahead of and alongside crewed assets to extend sensor reach and operational mass. The Australian path has stressed domestic industrial participation and a block upgrade roadmap to add mission kit capabilities over time.

Europe. Continental programs are folding wingman concepts into larger next generation fighter ecosystems. France, Germany and Spain’s FCAS program and its remote carriers concept pursue a layered set of unmanned platforms that range from light recoverable effectors to heavier loyal wingmen with mission modularity. Airbus publicly displayed a full scale Wingman concept in 2024 that signals Europe intends both attritable and more survivable reusable classes, but within a broader combat cloud architecture that emphasizes secure datalinks and sovereign mission systems.

China, Russia and other regional actors. China’s industry showed loyal wingman concepts to the public at Airshow China with platforms such as the FH-97 concept, framed as a partner to large stealth fighters and as an enabler of high-risk operations. Russia’s S-70 Okhotnik project tested in formation with Su-57 prototypes, illustrating a heavy UCAV approach to manned uncrewed teaming that prioritizes high-end survivability and internal weapons carriage. Turkey and others pursued indigenous jet UCAVs as well, with Turkey’s Baykar Kizilelma achieving first flight in late 2022 and being marketed as an unmanned fighter class capable of formation flights with crewed jets. These programs show that the loyal wingman idea is not just a Western phenomenon; it is being explored worldwide using multiple design philosophies.

Capability taxonomy and technical tradeoffs. Across programs the same design trade space recurs:

  • Survivability versus cost. Heavier, stealthier loyal wingmen with internal bays and high-end sensors increase per-unit cost and testing burden. Attritable jets accept lower unit survivability in exchange for larger numbers and faster iteration.
  • Autonomy envelope. Implementing authority delegation, from waypoint following through cooperative target prosecution, requires matured, certificable autonomy kernels, hardened datalinks and robust human oversight models. Programs such as Skyborg prioritized an autonomy core that can be deployed across multiple airframes, reducing duplication of software engineering across vendors.
  • Open mission systems and data fabrics. Meaningful manned uncrewed teaming depends less on a single airframe and more on common, interoperable mission interfaces and secure datalinks. European FCAS and other national programs explicitly call out combat-cloud level architectures as the force multiplier that makes wingmen effective.

Operational concept and human factors. The practical use cases are consistent: forward sensing and reconnaissance, electronic warfare and decoying, attritable strike packages, and when appropriate, weaponized effectors under human-in-the-loop or tightly constrained escalation authorities. Human factors remain a limiter. Pilots must retain situational awareness and command authority that matches legal and political expectations. This forces conservative operational envelopes in initial deployments and explains why many demonstrations stress ISR and EW first.

Interoperability, rules of engagement and legal issues. If wingmen are to carry weapons the policy and legal frameworks for employment must be solved in tandem with technical maturation. For multi-national teaming the problem compounds because partner nations expect sovereign mission systems, export controls constrain software exchange, and datalink security must meet the most restrictive participant. Program designs that emphasize modular payload bays and mission software containers can ease these frictions, but only if the political and acquisition frameworks keep pace.

Industrial and procurement implications. Two procurement archetypes emerged by 2024. One archetype is government-led, sovereign development focused on industrial capability and sovereign control. Another archetype is prime-led, export oriented systems using commercial practices to reduce unit cost and speed iteration. Australia’s MQ-28 shows aspects of both crates, and U.S. Vanguard awards show the value placed on injecting nontraditional primes and speed into the supply chain. Expect procurement to oscillate between those archetypes as governments reconcile sovereignty, budget discipline and operational urgency.

Where programs must make progress. For an operational, lethal, distributed wingman problem set to be solved reliably the community must demonstrate three things at scale. First, resilient human in the loop and human-on-the-loop command models that meet legal review. Second, hardened autonomy cores that can be certified and updated across platforms. Third, scalable and survivable datalinks and combat cloud services that work in contested electromagnetic environments. Until those are demonstrated under operational conditions at scale, most services will favor incremental capability increments such as ISR, EW and decoying missions rather than widespread kinetic employment.

Conclusion. By August 2024 unmanned wingmen were no longer a theoretical future. Multiple national teams had demonstrators, prototype flight results and doctrinal experiments in hand. The worldwide landscape is pluralistic. Some nations adopt attritable, software-driven jets to buy mass now. Others architect complex remote carrier families as part of multi-decade NGAD or FCAS efforts. The near-term operational impact will be incremental but real: enhanced sensing, distributed EW and new options to generate combat mass without commensurate pilot risk. The strategic inflection will come when nations can scale those capabilities under secure network architectures and with clear legal authorities for kinetic use. Until then the technology will continue to outpace policy, making thoughtful, data-driven experimentation essential to avoid brittle operational deployments.