Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 family has moved beyond tactical novelty and into a structural position in the global unmanned systems market. Since 2018 the platform’s combat-proven use in conflicts from Nagorno-Karabakh to Libya and especially Ukraine has catalyzed demand from middle power and developing states seeking affordable, precision strike and persistent ISR capabilities. Baykar’s own export accounting and public statements show a rapid expansion of purchase agreements and winning bids across three continents, a trend that accelerated through 2022 and into early 2024.
Two concrete datapoints make the scale visible. First, Baykar reported export agreements for the TB2 to a large and growing number of states; press statements in 2023 put that number in the high twenties. Second, in February 2024 Baykar told Reuters that it had started construction of a factory near Kyiv and that it had signed export deals for TB2 with roughly 30 countries, a signal that the company expects sustained demand and is pursuing internationalized production capacity to meet it. Those two facts together explain why we are seeing both wider geographic diffusion and deeper industrial commitment from the manufacturer.
What buyers are actually purchasing is worth breaking down. The TB2 is a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicle with endurance figures commonly cited at roughly a daylong sortie in optimal conditions and a payload capacity in the low hundreds of kilograms, sufficient for electro-optical/infrared sensor suites and small precision munitions such as Roketsan’s MAM family. That combination of persistent ISR and scalable strike makes the TB2 attractive to states that want to shift force structure toward distributed sensing and low-cost attritable strike options. At the same time the platform is not a high-altitude, survivable asset against peer air defenses; once robust integrated air defense systems and electronic warfare are applied its survivability drops, a lesson evident in later phases of the Russia Ukraine conflict.
Operationally the TB2’s battlefield record provides the export pitch. Open-source analysis and mainstream reporting credit TB2s with creating asymmetric effects by targeting logistics, fielded air-defense sensors, artillery and armored vehicles. Those outcomes helped convert battlefield reputation into export orders and into a branding effect that civilian crowdfunding drives leveraged in 2022, when public fundraisers in Europe aimed to buy TB2s for Ukraine and Baykar responded to that political moment with donations and production prioritization for Kyiv. The combination of public enthusiasm and battlefield visibility materially accelerated sales conversations in several regions.
From a technical and procurement perspective, several dynamics now determine future momentum. First, localization and co-production are becoming standard tender features. Customers increasingly ask for technology transfer, local maintenance and training, and in some cases local assembly — a shift Baykar appears to be accommodating through external factory plans and wider support packages. Second, munitions and C2 ecosystems matter as much as the airframe; buyers are buying a system that includes ground control stations, training, and weapons integration. Third, the industrial base behind Baykar benefits from Turkey’s investment in sensors and subsystem suppliers, but this vertical integration also leaves the company exposed to component supply chains and export-control dynamics that may complicate sales to some Western-aligned buyers.
Strategic implications are not merely commercial. The TB2 export boom changes regional balances in several theatres by lowering the threshold for states to field persistent precision UAS. That is visible in the Sahel, in parts of Africa’s Horn, in the eastern Mediterranean and in pockets of Asia where acquiring a few systems materially enhances local ISR and strike reach. The diffusion also creates second-order effects: demand for counter-UAS tools, electronic warfare suites, expeditionary logistics and pilot training. It pushes smaller states to rethink air-space management and rules of engagement because remote precision strike can be introduced quickly and at a fraction of traditional airpower cost. A proliferation curve of this sort tends to compress crisis decision time and to stress political and legal frameworks that were not designed for ubiquitously accessible stand-off strike.
But the boom has limits and vulnerabilities that buyers and policymakers must weigh. The TB2 is effective within a particular envelope: permissive to moderately contested airspace where heavy, layered, modern SAM arrays and dense EW fields are not pervasive. Against a peer actor with mature integrated air defenses and offensive EW the TB2’s attrition rates rise and its tactical utility diminishes. Equally, as TB2 numbers rise globally, so does the market for countermeasures; the same affordability that drives purchases allows adversaries to field inexpensive munitions and jammers at scale. Finally, the geopolitical optics of buying Turkish UCAVs differ across alliances and partnerships, especially where end use and export controls intersect with partners’ legal and normative commitments.
For militaries and planners the rational approach is pragmatic and systems-focused. TB2 purchases should be tied to doctrine changes: invest in networked C2, integrate UAVs into air defense suppression and targeting cycles, budget for attrition and spare parts, and build layered resilience through redundancy and EW-resistant communications. For strategic analysts the export wave is a reminder that influence can accrue through cost-effective technology transfer as much as through basing or alliances. Baykar is not only selling airframes; it is selling an operational concept that reshapes force design for buyers who can afford the training, munitions and support chains.
Short term outlook: expect the export trajectory to continue in 2024 as Baykar and competitors respond to persistent demand, to localized production requests, and to the normalization of UCAVs in national inventories. Longer term, the shape of the market will depend on counter-UAS developments, the pace of autonomy and AI-enabled C2 integration, and whether regulatory or alliance pressures alter procurement appetites. For professionals and policymakers the key takeaway is simple: the Bayraktar export boom is not just a sales story. It is a structural event in modern warfare that forces adaptation across doctrine, industry and law.