Since mid 2022 Russian forces have escalated use of the ZALA “Lancet” loitering munition as a low-cost, high-payoff counter-battery and strike asset. Western and open-source assessments by late 2023 characterized the Lancet family as one of Moscow’s most effective new capabilities on the battlefield, and Russian industry signaled an intention to scale production to meet demand.

What makes the Lancet tactically significant is not a single breakthrough in technology but a pragmatic mix of endurance, terminal velocity and electro-optical guidance that fits a well-solved battlefield problem: find artillery and high-value systems and then dive at them with a shaped-charge warhead. Reported variants have effective ranges in the multiple tens of kilometers and warheads in the low single-digit kilogram range, enough to disable exposed artillery, radars or soft-skinned logistic vehicles while remaining cheap relative to the systems they target.

Open-source tracking of combat footage captured an acute rise in Lancet employment through 2023. Databases that log strike videos and visual confirmations recorded hundreds of Lancet engagements by autumn 2023, with a disproportionate share aimed at towed and self-propelled artillery. That pattern is consistent with Russian doctrine shifting toward precision, sensor-to-shooter cycles that use small unmanned systems to reduce ammunition consumption and increase effect on Ukraine’s indirect fires.

The operational consequence for Ukrainian artillery crews was immediate: stationary or merely camouflaged batteries became highly exposed. Ukrainian units adapted on a tactical timescale with a palette of low-tech, high-effect measures that reveal the limitations of small loitering munitions and the adaptability of defenders.

  • Mesh, netting and “cage” screens. Early in 2023 images and unit reports showed artillery pieces and self-propelled guns covered with fishing nets, camo netting reinforced with chain-link and improvised metal mesh. In multiple documented cases these barriers either trapped approach trajectories or caused Lancets to detonate at a distance, markedly reducing lethal effect on the gun or tractor. The improvisation trade-off is clear: a more static, better-protected firing position raises survivability against Lancets but reduces mobility, complicating the classic “shoot and scoot” artillery doctrine.

  • Decoys and deception. Inflatable and wooden mock-ups of high-value systems including HIMARS and towed howitzers were widely reported in 2023. The goal is economic: force the attacker to spend a relatively costly precision munition on a fake target or, at minimum, to reveal targeting patterns and positions. Producers of commercial inflatable decoys confirmed rising demand consistent with their battlefield utility.

  • Electronic warfare and sensor denial. The Lancet’s electro-optical seeker gives it resilience to some EW techniques, but its kill chain depends on upstream reconnaissance. Russian Lancets are typically employed alongside higher-end ISR drones; if those sensors are neutralized or spoofed the Lancet is left with poorer situational information. Both sides continued to press EW and detection tools during 2023, and Ukraine prioritized localized jamming, direction-finding and rapid strike on exposed reconnaissance nodes to blunt the Lancet kill chain.

  • Small-arms and gun engagements. When nets and EW are unavailable troops resorted to simpler kinetic options. Reports and soldier footage through 2023 showed crews employing small arms, automatic weapons, and in some cases dedicated anti-drone systems to attempt to defeat Lancets before they impacted. The economics are perverse: shooting a Lancet with small arms is possible but not guaranteed, and dedicating expensive kinetic air defense to every launcher is not sustainable.

Why these adaptations matter for defense planners and technologists

First, the conflict underscores how a system-of-systems approach multiplies effect. Lancets by themselves are useful, but their combination with persistent ISR, targeting tablets and command posts made them disproportionately effective against dispersed but detectable targets. That same insight applies to defenders: layered countermeasures that combine passive protection, deception and EW can blunt a capability that would otherwise require expensive hard-kill systems to counter.

Second, cheap precision drives asymmetric cost imbalances. A Lancet sortie costs orders of magnitude less than a Western tank or an advanced radar it might take out. That economic reality forces either more resilient systems, greater mobility, or cheaper mitigation that shifts the attacker back to more expensive options. Ukraine’s use of nets and decoys is a textbook example of buying survivability with low-cost, rapidly deployable measures.

Third, the episode is a reminder that hardware advantages can be ephemeral. Lancets are effective until they are not. Countermeasures evolve, production bottlenecks appear, and sensors or logistics get targeted. Between 2022 and 2023 we saw both sideloading of Lancet-like concepts by other producers and rapid defensive innovation from Ukrainian units. The battlefield is a feedback loop where each side accelerates adaptation.

Policy and procurement takeaways

  • Prioritize layered defense. Passive measures such as reinforced netting and decoys buy time and reduce the need to use scarce hard-kill interceptors. Combined with portable EW they form a cost-effective defensive stack.

  • Invest in counter-ISR. Destroying or suppressing the reconnaissance that cues loitering munitions is as important as shooting the munition itself. That implies more emphasis on long-range detection, rapid strike capabilities against ISR nodes and resilient communications.

  • Track production and open-source indicators. Publicly visible rates of Lancet employment were an early warning of operational changes. OSINT datasets and open video repositories remain valuable for understanding both employment and countermeasure effectiveness.

Conclusion

By January 2024 the Lancet had established itself as a tactical game-changer in a narrow but decisive mission set: hunting artillery and exposed installations. Ukraine’s response was neither miraculous nor expensive. It was pragmatic: nets, decoys, EW and tactical discipline bought survivability into which higher-end solutions could be integrated. The lesson for future conflict is simple and uncomfortable: affordable precision at scale will force frontline operators to innovate with whatever is available, and those improvised solutions will often matter more in the near term than blue-sky technologies that take years to deliver.