Executive summary First person view or FPV drones emerged in 2023 as a tactical force multiplier in Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations. Cheap, fast, and piloted with immersive goggles, these platforms were optimized for precision close strikes against soft and lightly armored targets and for surgical attacks on defensive positions. Their rapid proliferation reshaped tactical tradeoffs on both sides of the front, forcing operational adaptations in training, procurement, and electronic warfare.
Background and technical profile FPV drones are lightly built racing-style quadcopters and hexacopters adapted to carry explosive payloads and to be flown by an operator through a direct first person video feed. Compared with line-of-sight recon drones, FPVs trade endurance for speed and maneuverability. They are typically hand-assembled from commercial components, cost a few hundred to under a thousand dollars depending on sensors and warhead, and require substantive pilot skill to operate effectively in contested environments. These characteristics made FPVs a practical mass-produced munition for units and volunteer manufacturers in 2023.
Production, procurement and force structure implications A distinctive feature of 2023 was the hybrid procurement model. Volunteer groups, foundations, and industry producers scaled output alongside state procurement. Notable private producers such as Escadrone produced standardized FPV attack frames and advertised monthly outputs and sub-$500 per-unit cost points, while national fundraising drives bought large batches for front-line units. Civil society fundraising initiatives in summer and autumn 2023 raised millions of hryvnias to purchase tens of thousands of FPV units for Ukrainian forces. The result was an industrialized small-munitions effort that blurred lines between state and non-state supply chains.
Tactics and operational employment FPVs filled several tactical roles during counteroffensive operations. Teams combined long-endurance recon drones for target acquisition with FPV strike crews for final attack. FPVs exploited low-altitude flight profiles to approach vehicles from weakly armored aspects and to penetrate fortifications through windows and doors. Units used FPVs to suppress enemy positions ahead of infantry advances and to destroy high-value soft or lightly armored assets, reducing the need to allocate scarce heavy antitank munitions in some scenarios. Training programs and unit-level expertise became a decisive factor because operator skill materially influenced hit probability.
Effectiveness against armor and defensive systems Field reporting from mid to late 2023 documented multiple instances in which FPVs damaged or set ablaze armored vehicles by striking vulnerable components. In practice a well-placed 1 to 2 kilogram warhead could disable or destroy tracked and wheeled vehicles by igniting fuel, detonating ammunition, or compromising optics and engine compartments. FPV strikes were not guaranteed kills and often required multiple attempts, but massed use and continual replenishment made attrition a viable tactic. The use of FPVs reduced some tactical dependence on high-cost antitank systems in localized fights, although FPVs did not replicate the range, stand-off safety, or guaranteed penetration of purpose built anti-armor missiles.
Limitations and the attrition problem FPV campaigns in 2023 faced steep attrition. The platforms are exposed to electronic warfare, small arms, air defense fires, and environmental factors such as weather and battery limitations. Published reporting and unit testimony from 2023 emphasized frequent mission failures from jamming, signal loss, or degraded video links, and a substantial proportion of launches failed to reach intended targets. Those operational shortcomings incentivized rapid iteration on systems, pilot training, and tactics but left commanders with a calculus of expendability: buy or build many to achieve effects at scale.
Countermeasures and adaptation Both sides invested in layered countermeasures. Electronic warfare and vehicle-level jammers reduced link reliability, while netting, small-arms fire and short range air defenses were used to physically intercept FPVs. Ukrainian organizations and units responded with improved pilot training, kit standardization, and integration of FPVs into combined-arms sequencing so that FPV strikes were timed to suppress enemy active protections or to exploit gaps revealed by reconnaissance assets. The overall pattern in 2023 was an action and reaction cycle: cheap offensive munitions drove counter-EW and hard-kill mitigations, which in turn pressured offensive innovators to find new tactics and suppliers.
Training, human capital and organizational changes A salient non-material investment was in human capital. Training centers focused on converting hobbyist pilots into combat-capable operators, and authorities emphasized squad-level doctrine that synchronized reconnaissance drones, FPV crews, and fire support. The operational lesson was clear: the platform matters but the pilot matters more. Units that institutionalized FPV crews, established maintenance supply chains, and linked drone strike planning into broader tasking cycles achieved disproportionately higher operational returns.
Ethical and legal considerations The low cost and dissemination of FPV munitions raised ethical questions about proliferation of improvised weapons, escalation, and control of targeting in environments with high civilian presence. By late 2023 commentators and analysts highlighted concerns over attribution, the blurred boundary between military and volunteer production, and the risk that commoditized lethal systems would lower thresholds for use. These debates were present in both technical assessments and public discourse.
Lessons learned for modern armies 1) Mass matters. A high rate of delivery and rapid replenishment of low-cost munitions can offset individual platform unreliability and change local force ratios. 2) Integration beats novelty. FPVs delivered most effect when embedded in combined arms sequences with reconnaissance, indirect fires, and maneuver elements. 3) Training is force multiplication. Skilled operators amplified the value of each platform and improved hit probabilities enough to justify investment in organized pilot training. 4) Antifragility in procurement. Hybrid supply chains that brought together volunteer initiatives, commercial producers, and military procurement allowed scale to be achieved quickly but created long term governance and quality control challenges.
Conclusion In 2023 FPV drones had a demonstrable tactical impact during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. They did not replace armored maneuver or precision deep fires, but they reshaped the tactical environment by offering low cost, highly maneuverable strike options that forced opponents to divert resources toward EW and close-in defense. For militaries planning for future conflicts, the FPV case in Ukraine underlines a simple but uncomfortable truth. Cheap, commoditized lethality can scale quickly and force doctrinal and organizational change. Preparing to operate and to defend against those systems requires investment not only in sensors and jammers but in people, logistics, and doctrine that accept attrition as an operational input rather than an afterthought.